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Saving the Babies or the Elderly in a Time of Crisis?
Joona R€as€anen
University of Oslo
In their important article, Haward et al. (2020) discuss
whether guidelines for treating extremely premature
babies should be altered to free up ventilators during
crises such as COVID-19 pandemic.1 The authors’
claim is that premature babies do not deserve special
consideration for ventilator treatment but merely
equal consideration. In this brief commentary, I con-
tinue their discussion by considering additional factors
that may help us determine whom we should save in
a crisis: babies or the elderly.
To illustrate the problem, we can summarize the
imaginary but very plausible case Haward et al. (2020)
raises as follows:
Jim, 75, has developed worsening respiratory distress
from the COVID-19. He will likely die unless he is
soon intubated and ventilated. At the same time,
Louise gives birth to her and her husband’s first, very
eagerly awaited child: a healthy but premature
newborn infant, Judy. Judy, like all infants at her age
and stage of development (23weeks old and weighing
only 600 g) needs to be intubated and ventilated or
CONTACT Joona R€as€anen joona.rasanen@ifikk.uio.no Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Arts and Ideas, University of Oslo, Postboks
1020 Blindern, Oslo, 0315, Norway.
1On March 2020, it was claimed that no matter which estimate we use, there simply are not enough ventilators for U.S. patients with COVID-19 in the
upcoming months (Ranney et al. 2020).
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else she will likely die. Judy and Jim are in the same
hospital. The adult ICU is full. There is only one
ventilator left, and it can be used for either Jim or
Judy. Who should get the ventilator?
Haward et al. (2020) raise several possible criteria
for making the decision. One such criterion is the
total number of life years lost when dying. For
instance, a newborn infant that dies can be expected
to lose roughly 80 life years, while a 75-year-old is
likely to lose just a few years. However, because some
adults who need ventilators have a survival rate higher
than some extremely premature infants, it is not obvi-
ous which we should save.
Accounts that consider only the total life years
lost—such as the deprivation account—cannot suc-
cessfully explain which loss of life is the greatest loss
to the one who dies. That is because what must also
be considered, in addition to the life years lost, is the
possible psychological connectedness and continuity
of the one dying to his or her future self.
For instance, healthy 75-year-olds have strong psy-
chological connections to their past and future selves.
They remember what has happened to them, and they
anticipate and care what will happen to them in the
future.2 However, in the relation between premature
newborn infants and their future, adult selves, there is
a much weaker degree of psychological connectedness.
McMahan (2002) has developed perhaps the most
sophisticated theory relating the psychological con-
tinuity of one’s future self to the ethics of killing and
saving. According to McMahan, because of the very
weak psychological link between infants and their
future selves, an infant’s time-relative interests in con-
tinuing to live are extremely weak. What this means is
that death matters less for an infant at the time than
it matters for the otherwise healthy septuagenarian.
The belief that death is not seriously bad for the
fetus or the premature infant itself, explains, for
instance, why we do not generally use more medical
resources to prevent miscarriages (Ord 2008; Simkulet
2017). None of this necessarily means that the death
of an infant does not matter at all, only that it does
not matter much in comparison to the death of what
can be called a standard human adult.3
This line of reasoning would further mean that if,
during pandemics such as COVID-19, we decide
whom we should save based on the intrinsic features
of humans, we should prioritize adults over prema-
ture infants, since the death of an adult harms that
adult more than the death of an infant harms
the infant.4
Be that as it may, when we take into account other,
extrinsic features, such as the distress and grief of the
parents of the dying baby and the similar emotions of
the relatives of the beloved dying elder, things get
more complicated.
While the death of someone aged 75 undoubtedly
brings sorrow and grief to those left behind, such
death often is anticipated and considered a natural
occurrence. However, the death of a young child is a
very different thing. Many feel it is unnatural to out-
live one’s child. Losing a child might feel like the
ultimate violation of the rules of life; people should
die when they are old, not when they are young.
Losing a young baby, especially, can be emotionally
overwhelming. At least one study shows that even six
years after the loss of an extremely premature infant, the
parents still suffer a lot from their bereavement (B€uchi
et al. 2007). The emotional impacts on the relatives can
thus be assumed to be more severe when a premature
baby dies than when an elder dies – despite the fact that
according to the time-relevant interest account death
harms an infant less than it harms an adult.
Taking into account the grief, distress, and sorrow
that others will experience when Jim or Judy dies,
there seems to be a compelling moral reason to save
the infant rather than the elder: the death of the latter
is less painful to his family members.
Therefore, whether we should save infants or the
elderly in time of crisis depends, at least in part, on
how much weight, if any, we give to the emotional
impact of people’s deaths on others or whether we
make the decisions based solely on the intrinsic
features of those at the risk of dying.
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Racial Disparities in Preemies and Pandemics
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As COVID-19 related hospitalizations surged in other
countries and began to rise sharply in the United
States, hospitals, healthcare systems, and states began
to grapple with the terrifying question of what to do
if ventilators became scarce. Centers began to develop
protocols to guide how scarce resources would, if
necessary, be allocated among different patients.
Extremely preterm infants continue to be born during
the pandemic and require critical care resources,
including ventilators (not because of COVID-19 but
because of their immature organ systems). Haward
and colleagues address the question of how these fra-
gile newborns should factor into scarce resource allo-
cation protocols (Haward et al. 2020). The authors
address important realities commonly encountered by
the neonatology community. Their compelling argu-
ments for supporting the claims of extremely prema-
ture infants to continued ventilator provision within
these protocols include: existing bias against extremely
premature infants, the difficulty in predicting the
outcome of a given extremely premature infant, and
the absence of acceptable tools to compare long or
short-term prognoses for an extremely preterm baby
(“Judy”) against those of an adult (“Jim”). The authors
rightly caution against the use of QALYs as potentially
leading to ableist and ageist discrimination.
Haward and colleagues acknowledge that many
groups have historically and currently encounter dis-
crimination, however, the conversation of scarce
resource allocation is not complete without addressing
such inequities. Healthcare disparities are too closely
intertwined with prematurity and COVID-19 out-
comes to discount in hopes of “leveling the field”
when considering whether Judy (the premature infant)
or Jim (the septuagenarian) gets the ventilator. We
must recognize disparities as they pertain to ventilator
allocation protocols and wish to highlight racial dis-
parities that have been exposed by the COVID-19
pandemic, and how these same disparities affect pre-
mature newborns.
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